article

Democracy and city life

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abstract   I evaluate the claim that modern urban regions are desirable sites for inclusive forms of democratic governance. Although certain features of city life do hold such promise, I argue that these same features coincide with exclusionary attitudes and activities that undermine democratic hopes. I then clarify the necessary conditions for more inclusive urban democracy, distinguishing my account from prominent criticisms of suburban culture and urban sprawl advanced by, among others, advocates of the new urbanism. I conclude with proposals for reform that emphasize creative uses of existing and emerging technologies and institutions, and a more democratic conception of eminent domain authority.

keywords   democracy, difference, cities, citizenship, eminent domain, new urbanism

1. Introduction

Political theorists have recently returned to the city, exploring modern urban regions as desirable sites for inclusive forms of democratic governance. Iris Young has suggested that repeated exchanges among urban residents from many cultural, ethnic, and class backgrounds ought to privilege a conception of politics 'as a relationship of strangers' in which 'persons and groups interact within spaces and institutions they all experience themselves belonging to, but without those interactions dissolving into unity or commonness',[1] and she argues that this vision of 'differentiated solidarity' and contested boundaries does not rest easily with prevailing liberal strategies of racial and class integration as responses to urban injustice.[2] Alan Ryan evinces a complementary concern with connections between the built forms of urban areas and the character of citizens, speculating that appropriately structured city spaces might encourage fruitful public encounters across various dimensions of difference.[3] In a similar vein, Susan Bickford

asserts that much of the prevailing 'architecture of our urban and suburban lives provides a hostile environment for the development of democratic imagination and participation', and she urges political theorists to examine more carefully 'how the built environment can cultivate or eradicate that specific stranger-like recognition that is central to the possibility of democratic politics in a diverse and unequal polity'.[4]

These theorists recognize that urban regions around the world exhibit profound inequalities of wealth, life chances, and political influence; they are imagining cities as they might be, not as they are. But my analysis suggests that the democratic promise and failings of cities are not easily separated: under prevailing political strategies for regulating land uses and economic activities, the very features of cities that appeal to democratic theorists coincide with patterns of wealth and influence that subvert democratic intentions, by allowing exclusionary attitudes and activities that diminish complex patterns of interdependence among citizens of a metropolitan area.

I elaborate the vision of city life central to these recent efforts, and offer reasons for skepticism. I then clarify the necessary conditions for inclusive metropolitan democracy, distinguishing my account from prominent criticisms of suburban culture and urban sprawl. I conclude with proposals for reform, emphasizing creative uses of existing and emerging technologies and institutions, and a more democratic conception of eminent domain authority.

2. Why cities? Density, diversity, and interdependence

I use the terms 'metropolitan life' and 'city life' to denote ways of life characteristic of modern urban regions, including both dense central city areas and more dispersed outlying residential and commercial areas that are linked to a central city, or cities, by transportation and communication networks, and corresponding patterns of trade and employment. Metropolitan areas may also be understood in terms of characteristic legal norms and political interests,[5] and distinctive psychological traits and associated habits and inclinations.[6]

Why look to modern urban regions to find conditions favorable to inclusive democratic governance? After all, city life seems often to be associated with a degree of *anomie*, characterized by a multiplicity of contacts with others, most of which lack any emotional depth and personal significance: physical proximity does not typically beget intimacy or solidarity.[7] In the city, we instead maintain our emotional distance from one another: the cacophony of urban life leaves us jaded, our capacity for sympathy and solidarity completely overwhelmed. Indeed, the scale on which visceral human suffering is apparent in the city forces many to withdraw from it, practicing a sort of emotional triage and physical distancing from the unlucky and downtrodden while traversing urban space.

Certainly, we can find in cities instances of love, friendship, solidarity, familial loyalties, and principled commitment to helping others. But many such atti-

tudes and practices are carefully sequestered: intimate associations are woven into our daily routines as we move among strangers between locations in the city; we avoid other commitments, shutting out much of the complexity around us as we navigate the variegated urban terrain to meet acquaintances, friends, or lovers in specific places. We move between familiar enclaves, ignoring the indifferent occupants of spaces we cross, or we move furtively through spaces whose occupants might be hostile to our presence. In addition, for those who devote substantial time and resources to helping others, the scale of social problems in large urban areas necessitates similar strategies of sequestering and exclusion: strict curfews on shelters, and informal criteria for admission and eviction, are examples of how even the most committed activists in cities must impose order on the unpleasant realities they seek to transform.

Louis Wirth believed that, in the city, a 'juxtaposition of divergent personalities and modes of life tends to produce a relativistic perspective and a sense of toleration of differences'.[8] But even if this is so, such toleration may simply be a grudging acceptance of difference as an unavoidable fact of urban life — not a fact to be celebrated, but merely endured, and perhaps occasionally feared or loathed. Georg Simmel and Wirth claim that the fractured and attenuated social psychology of the urban citizen both reflects and sustains the complex, impersonal, competitive, rationalized, and bureaucratized character of industrial society under capitalism. This may be a psychology suited to the toleration of difference, but it does not seem to be the basis of an inclusive ideal of citizenship grounded in mutual respect and reasoned cooperation toward shared goals.

And yet, Wirth also thought that the complexity of city life encourages individuals to join a range of associations based on shared interests, and he expected that these 'mutual interrelations' would tend to be 'complicated, fragile, and volatile'.[9] Residents of metropolitan areas depend on one another for a range of goods and services (water, electricity, police and emergency services, road and sidewalk maintenance, fresh produce, cooperation from neighbors in maintaining shared hallways and courtyards, and so on) that make daily life possible. These are intricate networks of mutual dependencies across time and space, and sometimes across distinctions of race, culture, and socioeconomic class.[10] In such settings, citizens may understand their interests as being intertwined in ways that demand cooperative activities, but that do not challenge their distinctive values, traditions, and aspirations in any fundamental way.[11] Furthermore, in modern urban regions we find widespread implementation of technologies of communication, information processing, transportation, and surveillance. These technologies generate network externalities, reducing transportation and communication costs; they thus provide the foundations for regional networks of various associations across increasingly expansive physical spaces.

Thus may city life hold the promise of meaningful participation in public life for a wide range of citizens across various differences, but also a distinctly political toleration that converges with a democratic ideal of citizenship, such as that

suggested by John Rawls in his account of public reason,[12] and Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson in their account of reciprocity and deliberative politics.[13] By virtue of density, diversity, and complex interdependence, inclusive democracy might emerge in the noisy, messy metropolitan areas of industrialized plural societies, just the places that were so often viewed with suspicion by generations of sociologists and urban planners.

3. Why cities? Inequality and exclusion

Democratic theorists thus have good reason to look to modern cities in search of inclusive democracy. But theorists should look to cities as much for their failings as their promise: these regions are characterized by rigid patterns of social exclusion and inequalities of wealth and political influence, especially along racial lines, and between parts of central cities and their outlying regions.

What are some of the obvious failings of cities, especially US cities, with respect to democratic concerns? Of course, the problems that concern me here (inequality and exclusion along the lines of race and class) are not unique to North American cities. But I examine the US case: if cities in this affluent and durable liberal democracy cannot resemble the democratic ideals popular in recent political theory, then the prospects for implementing core elements of such ideals elsewhere seem grim indeed.

Urbanization has generated patterns of industry and habitat that put considerable stress on surrounding ecosystems: urban residential sprawl and various commercial developments in and around cities consume arable land, deplete water tables, and contaminate ground water. A range of associated activities (industrial production, commercial transportation, highway commuting by employees in private automobiles, and so on) contribute to declining air, water, and soil quality. Municipal and state politics rarely alter the prevailing incentives for home and industry location that reinforce these patterns; indeed, some have argued that federal and state laws guarantee that city governments are relatively powerless to do so.[14] Efforts are sometimes made by local and state governments to alter prevailing incentives, through urban growth boundaries, for instance, or new taxation schemes to fund municipal works and allocate more equitably resources shared by several jurisdictions.[15] But the result is often increased political antagonism between central cities and their regions. Furthermore, officials seeking re-election (or to preserve their current appointments under new administrations) often have a strong incentive to accept the status quo with regard to jurisdictional authority over taxation and land use.[16]

Along with these ecological and political realities, patterns of inequality and exclusion persist between the affluent and the poor in US cities. Indeed, many urban pathologies (declining environmental quality, corrupt officials, discriminatory attitudes and outright racism, low levels of trust in local government, widespread *anomie* and diminishing public spiritedness, disputes between central

cities and suburbs, and rampant consumerism and its resulting waste) are variously implicated in disparities of wealth and opportunities. We should be especially troubled by the consistency with which these inequalities appear to sustain legacies of exploitation, oppression, and marginalization along racial lines.

For instance, the local politics of zoning and land use restrictions in US cities have been in part motivated by affluent suburban residents wishing to exclude from their neighborhoods those who are perceived as a threat to property values and the quality of public services, perceptions that are often framed in terms of racial differences. Whereas poor white households tend to be dispersed among both low-income and middle-income households in US urban regions, black and Hispanic poverty remains characterized by extreme concentration within central city neighborhoods that are isolated (both in terms of geography and popular imagery) from more affluent urban and suburban communities.[17] These impoverished neighborhoods tend to endure not only poorer services, but also poorer air quality, as they are often located close to urban industrial sites, highway systems, and vacant lots that are sometimes used as illegal dumping grounds or that remain heavily polluted from past commercial tenants.[18] Residents of such neighborhoods are often pessimistic and have little trust in government,[19] which is entirely justified, given the ineffectiveness of schools and other public services in these neighborhoods, and the uninspired efforts of municipal agencies to improve matters.

Two classes of inequality can be distinguished in US cities. First, there are economic inequalities: certain neighborhoods, typically in central cities, lack sufficient infrastructure to attract private investment. Housing stock is generally in poor condition, but access to credit for home purchases or improvement can be difficult, a trend that is exacerbated by the fact that most residents of these impoverished neighborhoods are black or Hispanic, and many banks continue to discriminate against these groups.[20] These areas often lack a range of reliable public and private services, such as road repair, emergency services and medical clinics. Policing by local authorities is often irregular and uninspired, failing to provide a sufficient deterrent to criminal elements and thus discouraging private investment by small businesses and homeowners. In addition, public schools in these neighborhoods are underfunded and understaffed, rarely providing adequate training for the youths in their charge.[21]

Second, there are social inequalities: in many spatially segregated, racially homogeneous, and economically isolated urban neighborhoods, many children grow up without sufficient emotional support and adult guidance. Their households and immediate community provide few, if any, stable daily routines, nor the informal lessons of personal responsibility and the importance of education and self-discipline, lessons that are generally provided by adult role models in the homes and communities associated with more affluent neighborhoods. In contrast, children in poor and isolated central city neighborhoods often face neglect and violence, both within and outside of their homes.[22]

These two classes of inequality are related: a significant number of children and adolescents in impoverished neighborhoods will lack the subtle, but vital, lessons of compassion, cooperation, and personal responsibility provided by a stable and supportive family environment and surrounding neighborhood. No matter how dedicated and creative teachers and administrators may be, public schools will be unable to compensate for the absence of these essential learning processes in the home and community. Lacking adequate formal and informal education, these neglected children will grow into young adults unable to compete in labor markets, and unlikely to possess much desire to contribute to their communities in constructive ways. For those children who give up on school early, gang involvement may be difficult to avoid. Because of a high and relatively stable demand for illegal narcotics, the illicit distribution of drugs is a lucrative activity, and the sense of despair and hopelessness associated with chronic poverty and unemployment ensures that some customers will be residents of the same neighborhoods as the sellers.

Given this troubling dynamic, residents of these areas searching for work are handicapped in several ways. The various pathologies of their neighborhoods limit the quality of their education and isolate them from formal and informal networks that inform prospective workers about employment opportunities.[23] Furthermore, new employment opportunities in manufacturing and retail are increasingly located in extended suburbs, as these firms seek lower overhead costs, easy access to transportation networks outside of the central city area, and proximity to suburban consumers. But many suburban communities have restrictive zoning regulations that sustain high housing prices, making it all but impossible for central city residents of modest means to relocate to neighborhoods closer to employment opportunities. Worse still, both central cities and suburbs are often poorly serviced by public transportation; indeed, getting from anywhere in many US city centers to peripheral locations is generally very time-consuming, and sometimes practically impossible without a private automobile. These conditions make it very difficult for job-seekers in the central city area to take advantage of existing employment opportunities.[24]

Given these inequalities, the play of urban politics only rarely suggests a keen sensitivity, on the part of relatively affluent citizens, to either alternative land uses or the broader consequences of their favored land uses. Cities tend to have relatively low rates of citizen involvement in local electoral politics.[25] When citizens do participate in local affairs, it may involve 'not in my backyard' activism by members of a specific neighborhood who see a proposed commercial development or public service as a threat to their property values. Public expressions of these fears often reveal widespread misperceptions about the relationships between race, gender, poverty, crime, and neighborhood quality.[26] For instance, stifling opposition can arise to affordable housing initiatives[27] or proposed bus routes to serve better central city (and often black or Hispanic) workers commuting to jobs near affluent (and most often predominantly white)

suburbs. Moreover, in many cities there is considerable resistance even to uses of tax revenues that seem widely beneficial and relatively inexpensive, such as drug treatment programs for non-violent offenders, subsidized prenatal care and training for low-income mothers, or job training programs for unemployed youth, especially those in low-income neighborhoods where public schooling is largely inadequate and where informal social support networks tend to be less effective than in more affluent suburban areas. Furthermore, prevailing laws hinder the power of cities to direct development in their surrounding regions, instead, giving community councils and municipal bodies considerable freedom to determine zoning regulations and investment decisions.[28]

4. Strategies of exclusion

Affluent citizens in urban regions tend not to exhibit the attitudes associated with the urban democratic hypothesis drawn from recent political theory. These citizens do not typically appear to embrace racial or class diversity in their decisions about residential locations, nor do they evince an eagerness to engage, in any serious and sustained fashion, in deliberative activities across various lines of difference. Instead, many affluent Americans have, since the 1950s, sought to live intensely private family lives within relatively large homes, located in carefully policed residential neighborhoods that are relatively homogeneous in terms of race and socioeconomic class. These neighborhoods are often located well away from central cities or are maintained in carefully policed enclaves within what have traditionally been the 'city limits'. These citizens have often been able to harness local politics to sustain this spatial status quo.

I do not want to overstate the cultural and racial homogeneity of suburban areas as a general point; these areas are increasingly diverse. There is also some evidence that emerging communities of affluent black and Hispanic families are beginning to mirror the suburban location decisions and neighborhood-building strategies pursued by affluent white families since the 1950s.[29] Yet the contrast between specific affluent urban and suburban residential neighborhoods, on the one hand, and dense central city areas characterized by concentrated poverty, racial homogeneity, and limited employment and investment opportunities and personal mobility, on the other, remains as striking today as it was to commentators in the 1960s and 1970s.[30] A great many affluent citizens still sort themselves into neighborhoods (whether in urban enclaves or outlying areas) that are relatively homogeneous with respect to race and socioeconomic class. In addition, many American families continue to seek relatively large houses in outlying residential neighborhoods with very little variety of land use, near good schools, and characterized by stable property values.

Given these widespread attitudes and motivations among so many affluent Americans, structures of local decision-making and public service provision tend to sustain the spatial patterns of land development that favor extended suburbs

and exclusive urban enclaves, on the one hand, and the isolation of impoverished central city neighborhoods, on the other. Nor is this tendency obviously misguided, from the perspectives of commercial interests and political actors: developers, planners, and officials can plausibly argue that they are simply responding to what American consumers have wanted for several decades, as reflected in market demand for personal automobiles, large suburban retail centers (featuring chain stores that can reap economies of scale), and large houses on private lots in low-density residential developments, located in communities that are relatively homogeneous with respect to race and class. Insofar as developers and planners are, in fact, meeting widespread demand for particular goods and services, politicians are motivated to support policies favorable to these commercial interests.

4.1 Exclusionary motivations

Why are modern US urban regions characterized by exclusionary attitudes and motivations? Some scholars have noted in American culture a long tradition of ambivalence about life in large cities. But outright racist attitudes, and more subtle discriminatory sentiments, among relatively wealthy white Americans are no doubt responsible for much of the historical exodus of affluent white families into extended suburban communities and sequestered urban enclaves, particularly following migrations of black workers to northern and Midwestern cities during the early to mid-20th century.[31]

The play of US politics over the past several decades has favored exclusionary motivations on the part of affluent and, especially, white families. Thus does Richard Sennett argue that the exodus of families to suburban communities during the latter half of the 20th century was driven not only by racial discrimination and economic imperatives, but also in large measure by a desire on the part of many Americans to avoid diversity and complexity in their life experiences. A general rise in affluence during the latter half of the 20th century allowed many middle-class Americans to act on a desire for simplicity in their lives (for a 'purified identity' centered around the family and household) by moving away from the diversity and disorder of city life. Outside of the city limits, these citizens created carefully controlled communities in which family life is the dominant form, and the household the dominant space, of social interactions. This tendency has, in Sennett's appraisal, been buttressed by a corresponding increase in the social roles that the family has been expected to play in the minds of many Americans and the corresponding impression that suburban life in carefully regulated neighborhoods will, by virtue of simplicity and order, encourage close emotional bonds within the family.[32]

But while developers and planners since the 1950s have arguably only been meeting a stable demand for such neighborhoods, they share responsibility for the bias toward these ways of living. In their eagerness to satisfy the preferences of affluent Americans for a particular vision of family life, they have foreclosed

other potentially viable forms of urban organization. For instance, in her influential work, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, Jane Jacobs emphasized a lack of attention among planners to the ways in which high population density, combined with mixed land uses, could lead to robust social networks in urban neighborhoods.[33] Jacobs argued that high population density along relatively short city blocks, with a diversity of residential and commercial uses and a mix of old and new buildings, are desirable features of urban neighborhoods. These features ensure that streets are often frequented for several primary uses (residence, work, and recreation), thus ensuring the safety of pedestrians in the area by maintaining frequent public encounters and informal mechanisms of community monitoring.[34]

Jacobs further argued that major cities become self-sustaining economies, generating import-substituting regions of producers and supporting transportation and communication networks, to provide for the diverse demands of residents and exporting industries in and around the urban center. Diverse firms in urban economies foster knowledge transfer across sectors, spurring economic innovation and growth.[35] When these processes are left to run their course, the result is communities in which diverse land uses, concentrated into relatively compact areas, ensure safe and frequent exchanges among members of many cultures and professions. Cities are, then, natural generators of economic and social diversity. But by challenging these spatial forms, planners had selected against diverse and disordered urban spaces.

In Sennett's view, this closure of possibilities in favor of carefully ordered spaces reflects a pathology of personal development: we develop a mature identity, as adults, not through either isolation or idealized unions with others like us, but instead, through a complex process of disconcerting and sometimes painful discoveries of the world around us, a world we both influence and are influenced by.[36] But this more mature outlook will not emerge from carefully ordered and purified spaces, bounded and regulated so as to sever ties of interdependence among citizens.

We can, I think, find much of value in Sennett's account as both an explanation and critique of the motivations of many affluent citizens in urban regions, without relying on his psychological model of personal development, or the simple urban–suburban spatial distinction, more relevant 30 years ago than today. The categories underlying Sennett's discussion of a mature identity and 'adult personality' ought, instead, to be understood as normative categories of citizenship: Sennett's maturity is an ideal of the *reasonable* democratic citizen under conditions of pluralism.

Democratic citizenship in plural settings requires a willingness to explore the plausibility of other interests, ideas, and perspectives, while accepting that our own beliefs and interests may be transformed in important ways through such encounters.[37] The acceptance of this possibility follows from the understanding of one's own identity as a work in progress, not constrained by some antecedent,

fully articulated moral scheme given by community, nation, religious tradition, or philosophical reflection. Rather, we define ourselves, and the reasonableness of our ends, in part through our encounters with others, and not exclusively or overwhelmingly in terms of given ideals. This account resonates with an ideal of reasonableness that has featured prominently in recent political theory,[38] and with Sennett's account of an adult personality that emerges from diversity and disorder.

4.2 Exclusionary politics

In an evocative passage of *The Production of Space*, Henri Lefebvre echoes Sennett's attention to disorder and conflict, suggesting that the possibility of violent disputes may well be the chief democratic virtue of city life: '*liberty* engenders contradictions which are also spatial contradictions. Whereas businesses tend towards a totalitarian form of social organization, authoritarian and prone to fascism, urban conditions, either despite or by virtue of violence, tend to uphold at least a measure of democracy'.[39] Urban spaces have too often been planned in ways that satisfy and sustain (without sincere and informed public interrogation) the freely stated preferences of citizens, in much the same way as firms attempt to hone their internal structure to be competitive in the face of consumer demands. But by doing so, we threaten to resolve the contradiction of freedom in favor of exclusionary strategies of control over urban spaces and activities therein, appealing to mere preferences, rather than reasoned judgments about public choices in a heterogeneous political community.

Thus the experiences of modern US cities, particularly central cities: city administrations are often forced to accept considerable autonomy for surrounding municipalities with respect to land use planning, given prevailing residential patterns, the preferences associated with these patterns, and local, state, and federal laws governing property and taxation. While residents of affluent residential enclaves seek to sever ties of interdependence with other citizens of the metropolitan region, central city governments must, somehow, attract investment and secure revenue to sustain the services they do offer; they tend to do so in ways that privilege commercial interests, and select against the density, diversity, and complex patterns of conflict and interdependence that are central to a more democratic metropolitan order.

Under prevailing political and legal institutions, and spatial patterns of residence and commerce, city politics must generally privilege business interests that either have a great deal invested in relatively fixed locations within or around the central city, or hold the promise of such investment for the city. Aside from generating incentives for corruption within revenue-strapped city governments, this systematic bias gives these interests greater effective voice in local politics, particularly on issues of land use and taxation. Because of this systematic bias, the costs and benefits associated with many location decisions tend to be assessed in terms of these privileged interests, while the costs borne by other, less advan-

taged citizens (for instance, lowered property values, disrupted neighborhoods, shifting patterns of employment, and exposure to pollutants) are systematically discounted.[40]

For city officials, privileging these evaluative practices may be advantageous: expensive housing developments and a variety of commercial land uses (shopping centers, sports arenas, new hotels, and convention centers) provide lucrative revenues for city administrations, as well as easily publicized increases in private investment and employment opportunities within the city limits. For city councils and planners, the use value of much of the city's space will reflect this desire to increase employment and revenues, and encourage further investment, all of which, in turn, may promise distinct political benefits for incumbent officials. To this end, generous compensation packages, promising tax breaks, and infrastructure renewal may be offered to prospective companies in an effort to lure investment into the city, often at considerable initial investment by the city itself.

However, a growing body of research suggests that the gains from such investments are at best unclear, and tend not to extend in any systematic way to other parts of the city. Entry-level employment for nearby residents is often limited, and those jobs that are made available generally offer unsatisfying work (often in retail or janitorial positions), low wages, few if any benefits, little if any job security, and no significant opportunities for promotion.[41] Furthermore, many such developments dramatically change traffic patterns, and construction (for instance, roadways and light rail or subway connections) too often disrupts residential neighborhoods in surrounding low-income areas without sufficient efforts by the city to provide secondary investments (such as, improved pedestrian access, more effective policing of walkways and public transit waiting areas, and financial incentives for commercial investment on adjoining properties) that would help residents to benefit from new transportation lines being put through their neighborhoods.

5. Democratic citizenship and the spaces of city life

By virtue of their demographic, economic, and spatial features, urban regions easily generate diversity, disorder, and complex interdependence. These same features also bring a range of values and interests into conflict. Given conflict, agreement cannot rest reliably on mere appeals to shared beliefs or traditions, nor on discriminatory racial preferences grounded in reasons that fellow citizens cannot reasonably be expected to find persuasive. Instead, spatial patterns of land use could emerge as a tentative and fragile stasis in the multifaceted process of social cooperation among the bearers of diverse and sometimes conflicting values and interests. But this vision is corrupted by allowing market forces and local politics to demarcate and sustain homogeneous zones of limited land uses: under such circumstances, the exclusionary motives of some citizens are shielded from public scrutiny and challenge.

When our own values, interests, and aspirations are threatened, we can be led toward either of two strategies. We may retreat from the broader public sphere, escaping the mutual dependencies of city life, perhaps by finding those who share our values and establishing an insular, purified community with them or we may accept interdependence and engage with others, considering their values and interests, and perhaps also reconsidering some of our own, so as to come to agreements that are mutually acceptable across a variety of differences. Prevailing patterns of metropolitan politics and planning have tended to privilege the first strategy, whereas the diversity and disorder of city life could instead make the second strategy viable, if the social and spatial forms of cities were allowed to unfold without unjustifiably privileging the exclusionary motivations of affluent citizens.

But the preceding analysis suggests that any such transformative effort will be fraught with difficulties, given prevailing incentives and entrenched interests. What hope, then, for more inclusive democratic politics in these urban settings?

I now want to trace the broad contours of an account of inclusive metropolitan democracy, but without making heroic demands on citizens in terms of preferences and motivations, and without assuming any sort of simplistic *spatial determinism* — that is, without relying on a narrow account of what spatial and demographic forms of city life are acceptable from a democratic point of view.

I want to avoid such demands and assumptions because much of what has been said so far resembles prominent criticisms of urban sprawl and suburban culture, and these critics are arguably democratic in orientation: they worry about the pernicious impact of market forces on solidarity and citizenship, and they imagine a world of more responsive municipal governments and widespread civic engagement. But these popular views cannot sustain inclusive metropolitan democracy, because they rely on contentious and ultimately exclusionary claims about what a city ought to look like, and how citizens ought to think and act therein.

To be sure, my favored account of democracy and the city draws a connection between the myriad forms of socioeconomic interdependence in urban regions, on the one hand, and the possibilities for inclusive and responsive democratic governance, on the other. But there are, I suggest, many specific values, aspirations, and spatial and organizational forms that comport with my favored account of democracy and city life, a point I hope to make clear by way of contrast with the less promising alternative approach suggested by the new urbanism. I conclude with some proposals that are consonant with my account.

5.1 Metropolitan democracy without spatial determinism

Consider the vision of city life advanced by 'the new urbanism' (a recent movement in architecture and urban planning). New urbanists decry the prevailing spatial forms of modern urban regions, arguing that suburban sprawl, dependence on the private automobile, and single-use zoning are inimical to vibrant com-

munities and engaged citizens. Incentives for home and industry location outside central cities have led to inefficient uses of physical space and congested traffic arteries, features that benefit no one but construction and automobile companies, property developers, and realtors. Residents may not especially value sprawling low-density residential developments, yet they must accept them given prevailing incentives: an affordable house near good schools, in a safe neighborhood with reliable public services, often requires a private automobile and a suburban location. But the resulting spatial forms undermine public-spiritedness, leading to widespread alienation, antagonism, mutual distrust, and despair.

The new urbanism offers, instead, a vision of neighborhoods where workplaces, shopping centers, and recreational activities are all within a reasonable walking distance for most residents and where the near-constant use of public spaces for a variety of activities makes the streets safe and motivates residents to participate in public activities aimed at maintaining the quality of their shared spaces.[42] New urbanists criticize the extraordinary power of private developers to shape the character of public spaces without much by way of constructive citizen involvement,[43] and they thus question the widespread reification of personal preferences and market forces in urban politics. In addition, like Jacobs, the new urbanists draw our attention to how the built forms of our shared spaces can affect our attitudes and motivations. But as David Harvey notes, the new urbanists seem to embrace (with insufficient reflection and argument) a particular vision of authentic and desirable communities, and they suppose that such communities will emerge from particular built forms.[44]

Spatial factors do shape and constrain social possibilities, certainly, but the relationship is complex and reciprocal. Physical environments constrain us in important ways, but these environments are in turn shaped by the social practices that arise within them, a reciprocal causality recognized at least since Marx and central to prominent examinations, by David Harvey and others, of how urban spaces are produced and reproduced (with attendant inequalities of wealth and control over resources) through social practices and in light of specific values and interests that are embodied in prevailing political and legal institutions.[45] We should thus be skeptical of any claims that spatial forms strictly determine social processes. Nor should we conclude that there are but one or a few viable combinations of spatial forms and social practices. We are led instead to a more nuanced view of the relations between built forms, norms and practices, and public institutions.

Urban planners before Jacobs and Sennett proceeded from the assumption that processes of urbanization, left to themselves, are corrupting and degenerative, aesthetically unpleasing, and ecologically unsound. No doubt there is some truth to this position, but if we read Jacobs and Sennett through Harvey and Lefebvre, we find a skeptical challenge to this normative stance: there is no simple relation between prevailing ethical and aesthetic norms, specific built forms and spatial practices, and the political and economic viability of communities. Assuming

otherwise leads easily to planning that stifles solidarity and vitality, by ignoring how the norms, practices, and spatial forms of a given community may be well suited to particular material and organizational conditions, even though they fail to meet a prevailing aesthetic ideal (for instance, one that sees urban economies as dirty, unhealthy, and bound up with crime and misery). We need to acknowledge the contingency and complexity of the historical relations between ethical and aesthetic ideals, particular norms and practices, and associated spatial forms. Moreover, these relations need to be critically assessed at every turn against other important standards, such as the safety and economic viability of neighborhoods.

This approach has the virtue of not committing us to any one conception of what a city is: there are myriad particular configurations of residential and business land uses, and associated communications and transportation networks, that are arguably urban, and that sustain stable patterns of socioeconomic interdependence suitable to inclusive and deliberative forms of democratic governance. Nor does this approach require that citizens be bound together by a particular view of what their shared spaces ought to look like and what activities are appropriate therein.

But in contrast to this stance, the new urbanists seem to assume a relatively straightforward connection between specific spatial forms and authentic, livable communities; so they are led to encourage neighborhood solidarity and civic engagement through specific forms of architecture and land use that, while perhaps fostering a sort of democratic engagement at the neighborhood level, may nonetheless be in tension with a broader and more inclusive vision of democracy and city life. Rather than fostering complex interdependence among citizens from diverse walks of life and across a variety of built forms, the new urbanism may instead permit the purification of public spaces according to particular standards of acceptable behaviors and appearances.

There are, of course, standards of behavior that, when enforced, protect anyone and everyone. But how often are matters so clear? The fear of difference and resultant efforts to purify public and semi-public spaces are common themes of suburban development in cities throughout the industrialized world. Buildings are designed, and public spaces bounded, in ways that discourage all but a few sanctioned uses. Private security forces patrol shopping malls and gated suburban communities, assigned by property owners the duty of monitoring or evicting those who 'seem suspicious' — which is to say, those who occupy these spaces, but whose appearance and activities do not conform to a specific conception of what behaviors are appropriate to these spaces.[46] The new urbanists do not give us sufficient moral resources to interrogate and challenge these attitudes and activities.

We can and must go beyond the new urbanists' appeal to a particular vision of the livable urban community. Jacobs reminds us that forms of urban life once deemed undesirable, even intolerable, may appear in an altogether different light when evaluated according to alternative criteria of desirability. Sprawling

suburbs and edge cities may well reflect reasonable preferences that we have no good reason to question in a free and fair society. But perhaps more importantly, they may also feature emergent identities, associations, and artistic expressions that require a reconsideration of prevailing moral and aesthetic standards regarding the desirability of these spatial patterns. Furthermore, these forms of community may themselves generate demand for new technologies to manage more effectively the environmental and civic failings of these spatial forms.

This said, prevailing incentives for residential and commercial locations impose rigid constraints on ways of life in and around the city (for example, in many cities, a pedestrian-based lifestyle is restrictive and outright hazardous) and these incentives are in part sustained by local, state, and federal laws and government subsidies. Even if these incentives ultimately reflect the reasonable preferences of many or even most residents, we should be skeptical that the preferences of the majority ought to constrain the possible forms of urban life as severely as they often do. Some locational and associational preferences may be reasonable, but they are not immutable and beyond reproach simply by virtue of their reasonableness: they are not exempt from calls for justification by those who feel that their aspirations are unjustifiably limited by the choices of others.

Thus, we should be open to new technologies and institutions, and innovative applications of existing technologies and legal categories, that lessen the constraints imposed by prevailing preferences and incentives, and existing infrastructure, upon our choices of where to live, how to live our lives together, and how to weigh long-term social and environmental costs. What we must pay close attention to are the patterns of interdependence that attend particular choices and associated spatial forms, and whether these patterns are compatible with inclusive and responsive democratic politics.

5.2 Toward inclusive metropolitan democracy

To this end, a variety of initiatives present themselves as desirable, insofar as: (1) they use both existing and emerging technologies and legal norms in creative ways that secure desired benefits while ameliorating, and more equitably distributing, social costs; (2) they do not threaten to sever ties of interdependence among residents of a metropolitan region, and indeed may foster such ties by enhancing mobility and employment opportunities; and (3) they do not merely sustain the values and interests of the majority as exempt from widespread public scrutiny and deliberative contestation.

5.2.1 Urban transportation   Consider the issue of urban transportation choices. The private automobile is a dominant feature of urban life in North America, and designing neighborhoods around car travel has had the consequence of making some urban lifestyles less desirable: walking to and from work or shopping is often difficult and sometimes unpleasant, even dangerous, especially when traveling along narrow, poorly maintained sidewalks next to busy streets.

Furthermore, carrying heavy loads for any significant distance by foot, or on public transportation, is awkward and time-consuming. Bicycle travel in and around many cities is a perilous undertaking, given prevailing road design and inattentive and sometimes hostile drivers. Improved road design (wider sidewalks and distinct bike lanes with periodic physical barriers on some stretches of road to separate cyclists from auto traffic), regular maintenance, and more consistent policing of roads and intersections would mitigate these problems. In addition, insofar as investments in roadways and parking areas amount to an implicit subsidy to drivers, we should encourage government incentives that reward alternative commuting strategies by employees (for instance, expanding employer rebate programs for workers who use public transit and providing grants for companies that install shower and changing facilities at the workplace for those who bike to work). In concert with such initiatives, the development of defunct or underused urban rail networks into multi-use pathways, as well as bicycle and pedestrian pathways alongside active urban and suburban rail lines, may foster pedestrian and bicycle commuting from outlying areas into central business and residential districts, provided these pathways are well maintained and routinely patrolled to ensure the safety of users.

But the private automobile is undeniably convenient, allowing us considerable mobility and flexibility in deciding where to live and work. Furthermore, technological advances (such as hybrid gas–electric engines and fuel-cell power sources) promise less pollution and greater energy efficiency. How might we reap the considerable benefits of cars in and around cities, while mitigating their objectionable costs?

Promising, in this respect, are car cooperatives that have arisen in several European and North American cities, providing flexible short-term rental arrangements for members, who pay a modest monthly fee. Cars can be leased by the hour, or for one or several days, with reservations made over the telephone or from a networked computer, and reserved cars are unlocked with an electronic keycard. Most of the cars provided by these cooperatives are compact, fuel-efficient models that are ideally suited for short trips within and around the city or to nearby towns and recreational areas. Several of these cooperatives have begun to include the newest hybrid-engine cars in their fleets, allowing members to take advantage of emerging technologies at relatively low personal cost. Vehicles are made available at parking areas throughout the city, including several at major public transit hubs. Hourly rates for cooperative members typically include the costs of both gas and insurance, and are competitive with those offered by conventional auto rental agencies. Such cooperatives provide a convenient 'middle ground' between car ownership, on the one hand, and reliance on public transit, bicycle, or pedestrian travel, on the other.[47]

These are examples, then, of how judicious transformation and regulation of urban space, paired with creative ownership and use schemes for existing and emerging technologies, can help reap the benefits of those technologies

in equitable ways, while simultaneously ensuring that some ways of urban life are not unreasonably foreclosed by the transportation and location choices of others.

5.2.2 Land uses

Consider the issue of land use policy and the power of eminent domain in and around cities. Urban eminent domain claims typically involve the city or state government taking private property for some use that is in the public interest, and compensating owners at fair market value. Eminent domain authority is often used to site controversial facilities (or 'locally unwanted land uses', as they are sometimes described) such as highways, prisons, power lines, landfills, and waste-processing plants. The power of affluent neighborhoods to influence land uses in their jurisdictions, and to mount aggressive campaigns against unwanted developments, means that these facilities are likely to be located in areas where residents will not or cannot easily object.

The siting of undesirable facilities near poorer neighborhoods might not in itself be problematic from a democratic standpoint, if the personal costs of moving from an established home (for those who leave) or accepting dramatic changes in the character of one's community (for those who stay) are carefully researched in consultation with residents themselves, and if terms of compensation take these assessments into account. But this is rarely the case. Instead, cities often site highway extensions and waste facilities in or near poorer neighborhoods with only cursory consultation, and in spite of concerns over health risks and the vulnerability of displaced families. And even if some facilities are sited without much controversy, the result may be potentially hazardous neighborhoods that, instead of being transformed into nonresidential areas by local, state, or federal legislation, are left as the only feasible residential options for citizens of limited means.

Other exercises of eminent domain authority involve the construction of large chain stores, sports stadiums, or conference centers. Although these facilities often do provide significant benefits to nearby residents, there are almost always powerful parties who also stand to profit, and who can influence politicians and sway popular opinion through media campaigns. Indeed, the politics of these sorts of location decisions generally involve the clash of a few very wealthy or very vocal interests, or both. Developers sometimes succeed in having the city oust families from their homes and communities, without due consideration as to whether these citizens can afford to live elsewhere in the city given the market value of their properties. On other occasions, a few vocal activists may succeed in preventing a proposed development that would, in fact, benefit many locals, and which these residents would probably support were they sufficiently informed. In some cases, these efforts may be grounded in reasonable concerns about environmental impact, preservation of historical sites, or the maintenance of neighborhood character, but in other cases, such concerns may mask narrower and more controversial aims, such as the maintenance of property values for a

small group of existing homeowners or maintaining an aesthetic ideal or ideological stance only supported by a minority of residents.

All of which is to say that assessments of the public interest in metropolitan eminent domain cases do not seem especially inclusive or deliberative in character; furthermore, they are vulnerable to distortions associated with privileged voices in urban politics. And yet, vital facilities must be located somewhere, and some commercial developments (affordable housing and retail centers) would be widely desired (or at the very least, judged to be acceptable) by most residents were they sufficiently informed and given the opportunity to deliberate together on the matter, without the distorting effects of wealthy and privileged voices. How, then, should we accurately assess the public interest, provide vital services, and negotiate fair compensation?

One plausible solution involves the creative use of existing legal precedents to foster interdependence through a more equitable distribution of influence over land uses: extend eminent domain authority to nontraditional organizations that are sufficiently representative of a distinct constituency, members of which cannot easily find voice under prevailing legal and political institutions. By 'sufficiently representative' in this context I have in mind associations that are highly responsive to the reasonable interests of marginalized citizens. And although it is certainly possible that an association could be reliably responsive to a marginalized constituency without extensive consultation and deliberation, my proposal of democratic eminent domain authority is consistent with a normative model of regional democracy that encourages informed and sincere deliberation, by a range of interested parties, both within and across various spatial and institutional scales. On this model, such deliberation is taken to be vital to legitimate democratic governance: political power must be grounded in sincere and plausible reasons offered to and evaluated by those affected by exercises of authority, regardless of prior constituencies. Given this principle of legitimacy, centralized authority structures can coordinate local associations, which, in turn, regulate their own activities and cooperate when necessary with other representative associations.[48]

An example of a representative community association in a poor neighborhood being granted the sort of authority I have in mind, and using it in ways consonant with my account, is Boston's Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI). The DSNI is a non-profit community association that successfully petitioned the city government and state courts to gain eminent domain authority over vacant properties in their neighborhood, thus giving the association effective control over local land uses. The DSNI's eminent domain authority is exercised through a corporation, Dudley Neighbors Incorporated (DNI), led by a board composed of appointees from the DSNI and local government and courts. The DNI administers acquired properties in accordance with a development plan determined by the DSNI itself, which is actively involved in programs to improve housing, employment opportunities, education, environmental quality, and even to foster

urban agriculture in the neighborhood. The DSNI board is comprised of residents drawn from each of the neighborhood's three main ethnic groups, as well as representatives from local churches and non-profit organizations, community development associations, small businesses, and neighborhood youth.[49]

To replicate the DSNI experience elsewhere would require considerable institutional flexibility, in particular, a willingness to forge new legal precedents and regional oversight procedures with respect to eminent domain claims.[50] State and federal subsidies may also be required, specifically, funds to match grants and guarantee loans taken by the association in question to compensate property owners for takings. In the DSNI case, a Ford Foundation grant played a significant role in this regard.[51] It is an important question whether private agencies could meet wider demand for grants and especially loans;[52] but regardless, it seems likely that public funds and government regulation will be required to foster and sustain initiatives based on the DSNI model. Unlike many existing government subsidies in agriculture and industry, however, these proposed uses of public resources have the virtue of enhancing democratic fairness by ensuring that effective influence over shared public spaces is not merely a luxury of the affluent.

A more democratic conception of eminent domain power, encouraging as it does more exchanges among more empowered associations, might seem to invite exclusionary impulses. After all, community associations would, on this view, have considerable authority to exclude others from their neighborhoods and to control activities therein. But my analysis has suggested that this concern is not limited to the proposal I am endorsing: many affluent communities already possess de facto eminent domain authority, insofar as they are able to influence zoning ordinances and local taxation policies to control the character of their shared public spaces, often through corporate entities such as homeowner associations. A broader conception of eminent domain authority does not obviate concerns for personal freedoms and fair equality: some fundamental liberal and democratic constraints must apply to any association that exercises authority within a jurisdiction.

A more pragmatic worry is that broader eminent domain powers will lead to more deadlock in regional siting decisions: if a variety of associations have a great deal of influence over land uses in their immediate vicinity, then controversial facilities will almost certainly never be built and vital public services will not be provided. But deadlock is already a concern with controversial land uses in and around cities. The difference, under a democratic conception of eminent domain authority, is that more parties would be able to wield influence over siting decisions. More opportunities for deadlock might exist, but perhaps also more opportunities for fair bargaining. It is no virtue of the status quo that it results in somewhat less deadlock than a more democratic alternative, simply by ensuring that bargaining positions are often dramatically unequal, and so facilities are generally sited near those citizens with relatively little bargaining power.

While this may be an expedient rationale, it cannot be a satisfying justification from a democratic point of view.[53]

Certainly, we should be concerned if newly empowered associations were to use their authority to take property and control land uses in arbitrary or merely self-serving ways, without offering sincere and plausible reasons to affected parties, both within and outside their jurisdictions. We should be similarly concerned if these associations sought to distance themselves from important regional concerns. But again, these caveats apply as forcefully to gated suburban communities and urban condominium associations as they would to empowered representative associations in distressed central city neighborhoods.

Furthermore, these caveats do not speak directly to the pressing concerns of the sorts of urban communities that might plausibly seek eminent domain authority. In many poorer city neighborhoods, vacant lots, empty houses, and deserted commercial properties are often used for criminal purposes or become illegal dumping sites for both household and commercial waste. Effective control over these spaces is vital to improving the safety and vitality of these neighborhoods, but indifferent (and often nonresident) property owners and unresponsive public agencies make such transformation difficult, if not impossible. If community organizations in these neighborhoods could translate the informed deliberations of committed residents into effective control over these spaces, then these residents would gain the power to shape the character of their public spaces to a degree comparable to that already possessed by affluent homeowners elsewhere in the metropolitan area.

6. Concluding remarks

My aim has been to evaluate the claim that modern urban regions are ideal sites for inclusive democracy, especially in plural societies. The hope is that myriad mutual dependencies will foster and sustain an engaged public and responsive institutions, without threatening freedom and stifling diversity. I have suggested that this hope, while not unreasonable, is undermined by the exclusionary realities of metropolitan politics. Cities may well tend toward density, diversity, and complex interdependence across cultural, racial, and class distinctions. Yet citizens do not necessarily embrace these linkages, and indeed, much urban politics seems to involve attempts to diminish interdependence, and such efforts may well appear democratic, as citizens with shared values and interests come together to forge a shared way of life — or, more often, to maintain the value of their homes and quality of their public services against perceived threats from outsiders. Nor is some such sorting of citizens into distinct communities necessarily objectionable in itself, from a democratic standpoint.[54] But free association and shared preferences do not uniformly justify exclusionary efforts, least of all those based on odious racial prejudices. More generally, I have argued that we should object to the privileging of certain voices in urban and suburban land use

decisions, and the extent to which the preferences of some citizens can limit the life choices of others in ways that are not open to the public interrogation and contestation that democracy requires.

To make city life more democratic, we must structure institutions and apply technologies in ways that allow citizens themselves to distinguish, through public activities, between reasonable and unreasonable preferences and activities. By improving the bargaining positions of citizens who face diminished life prospects through no choices of their own, and by giving them effective influence over the character of their shared spaces, we sustain interdependence by ensuring that no one community or neighborhood can be easily imposed upon by the choices of others or effectively excluded from a variety of metropolitan markets and public services. Every community, every neighborhood, can, under the proposals I have outlined here, realistically challenge decisions made by others that impose unreasonable burdens on them.

Indeed, the reasonableness of burdens is precisely what should be at issue in municipal politics. By enhancing opportunities for alternative urban lifestyles and effective influence over local land uses, citizens can realistically engage in debates about burdens, benefits, and trade-offs without their voices being discounted merely by virtue of such factors as relative poverty, undesirable location, or unpopular transportation choices. In this way, interdependence is maintained in the metropolis, and democratic fairness is satisfied.

notes

1. Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 234, 237.
2. Iris Marion Young, *Inclusion and Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), Ch. 6, especially pp. 204–28.
3. Alan Ryan, 'The City as a Site for Free Association', in *Freedom of Association*, edited by Amy Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998): pp. 314–29. See also Richard Sennett, 'The Spaces of Democracy', *Harvard Design Magazine* (summer 1999): 68–72.
4. Susan Bickford, 'Constructing Inequality: City Spaces and the Architecture of Citizenship', *Political Theory* 28 (2000): 356, 371.
5. Gerald E. Frug, 'The City as a Legal Concept', *Harvard Law Review* 93 (1980): 1059–154; Engin F. Isin, *Cities without Citizens: Modernity of the City as a Corporation* (Montreal: Black Rose, 1992).
6. Georg Simmel, 'The Metropolis and City Life', in *Georg Simmel on Individuality and Social Forms: Selected Writings*, edited by Donald N. Levine (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1971): pp. 324–48; Richard Sennett, *The Uses of Disorder: Personal Identity and City Life* (New York: Norton, 1970).

7. Simmel, 'The Metropolis and City Life'.
8. Louis Wirth, 'Urbanism as a Way of Life', *American Journal of Sociology* 44 (1938): 15.
9. Ibid., p. 22.
10. I follow a common practice of using 'race', 'racial', 'black', 'white', and 'Hispanic' in reference to groups whose members are united by superficial ascriptive traits (most notably skin color) and shared historical experiences (most obviously legacies of oppression and discrimination, but also shared cultural symbols and traditions).
11. Compare Richard Sennett, *Conscience of the Eye: The Design and Social Life of Cities* (New York: Norton, 1990), pp. 132–7.
12. John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 212–54; 'The Idea of Public Reason Revisited', *University of Chicago Law Review* 64 (1997): 765–807.
13. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 52–164.
14. Frug, 'The City as a Legal Concept'.
15. See Myron Orfield, *Metropolitics: A Regional Agenda for Community and Stability* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1997).
16. Peter Peterson, *City Limits* (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1981) argues that mobile capital undermines taxation for redistributive aims. Others argue that internal political incentives are the dominant force driving the focus on production instead of distribution in city politics. See, for example, Clarence Stone, 'Urban Regimes and the Capacity to Govern: A Political Economy Approach', *Journal of Urban Affairs* 15 (1993): 1–28. For a constructive approach, see David L. Imbroscio, *Reconstructing Urban Politics: Alternative Economic Development and Urban Regimes* (London: Sage, 1997) and 'Reformulating Urban Regime Theory: The Division of Labor between State and Market Reconsidered', *Journal of Urban Affairs* 20 (1998): 233–48. See also Ira Katznelson, *City Trenches: Urban Politics and the Patterning of Class in the United States* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1981) and Gerald E. Frug, *City Making: Building Communities without Building Walls* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).
17. See William Julius Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 46–62; but see also Paul A. Jargowsky, 'Beyond the Street Corner: The Hidden Diversity of High-Poverty Neighborhoods', *Urban Geography* 17 (1996): 579–603. On concentrated poverty in a predominantly white neighborhood of Columbus, Ohio, and the similarities between such neighborhoods, black or white, see Yvette Alex-Assensoh, 'Myths about Race and the Underclass: Concentrated Poverty and "Underclass" Behaviors', *Urban Affairs Review* 31 (1995): 3–19.
18. See Vicki Been, 'Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?', *Yale Law Journal* 103 (1994): 1383–422.
19. See, for instance, Michael R. Greenberg, 'Improving Neighborhood Quality: A Hierarchy of Needs', *Housing Policy Debate* 10 (1999): 601–24.
20. Federal law forbids racial discrimination in home mortgage and business lending, and there is some debate over whether racial discrimination remains prevalent among realtors and banks, and if so, what form this discrimination typically takes:

preference for members of a favored social group or the use of group membership as a signal of borrower reliability in lieu of more detailed (and costly) information about particular candidates? On this debate and related themes, see Stephan Thernstrom and Abigail Thernstrom, *America in Black and White: One Nation, Indivisible* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997); John Yinger, 'Housing Discrimination is Still Worth Worrying About', *Housing Policy Debate* 9 (1998): 893–927. Alicia H. Munnell, Geoffrey M.B. Tootell, Lynn E. Browne and James McEneany, 'Mortgage Lending in Boston: Interpreting HMDA Data', *American Economic Review* 86 (1996): 25–53 control for relevant personal and neighborhood characteristics of individual borrowers in Boston, yet still find race-related differences in mortgage lending. Helen F. Ladd, 'Evidence on Discrimination in Mortgage Lending', *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 12 (1998): 41–62 provides an overview of recent research, but see James J. Heckman, 'Detecting Discrimination', *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 12 (1998): 101–16 on concerns about variable definition, measurement issues, and distributional assumptions related to unobserved characteristics among applicants. It is not clear that these problems, in fact, undermine Munnell et al., 'Mortgage Lending in Boston' (see especially pp. 42–3). Yinger, 'Housing Discrimination' addresses some of Heckman's concerns (but not the worry that perverse inferences may result from differences in the variance of unobserved, but relevant, applicant characteristics). On these concerns consider also Bradford Cornell and Ivo Welch, 'Culture, Information, and Screening Discrimination', *Journal of Political Economy* 104 (1996): 542–71. On home ownership and residential segregation, see Daniel Immergluck, 'Progress Confined: Increases in Black Home Buying and the Persistence of Residential Segregation', *Journal of Urban Affairs* 20 (1998): 443–57; Alex Schwartz, 'Bank Lending to Minority and Low-Income Households and Neighborhoods: Do Community Reinvestment Agreements Make a Difference?', *Journal of Urban Affairs* 20 (1998): 269–301. On commercial investment and the racial composition of neighborhoods, see Daniel Immergluck, 'Neighborhoods, Race, and Capital: The Effects of Residential Change on Commercial Investment Patterns', *Urban Affairs Review* 34 (1999): 397–411.

21. On the complex interplay between historical legacies of racial discrimination, on the one hand, and persistent disparities with respect to accumulated wealth, neighborhood quality, and life chances, on the other, see Melvin L. Oliver and Thomas M. Shapiro, *Black Wealth, White Wealth: A New Perspective on Racial Inequality* (New York: Routledge, 1995) and Dalton Conley, *Being Black, Living in the Red: Race, Wealth, and Social Policy in America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).

22. See Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged* and *When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor* (New York: Knopf, 1996); Alex-Assensoh, 'Myths about Race and the Underclass'; Elijah Anderson, *Code of the Street: Decency, Violence, and the Moral Life of the Inner City* (New York: Norton, 1999).

23. Again, see Conley, *Being Black, Living in the Red*. See also Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged*, pp. 60–1; Philip Moss and Chris Tilly, *Stories Employers Tell: Race, Skill, and Hiring in America* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001), pp. 209–48; Keith R. Ihlanfeldt, 'Information on the Spatial Distribution of Job Opportunities within Metropolitan Areas', *Journal of Urban Economics* 41 (1997): 218–42.

24. See David Harvey, *Social Justice and the City* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973),
    pp. 56–79; Harry J. Holzer, 'The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis: What has the
    Evidence Shown?', *Urban Studies* 28 (1991): 105–22; Harry J. Holzer, Keith R.
    Ihlanfeldt and David L. Sjoquist, 'Work, Search and Travel among White and Black
    Youth', *Journal of Urban Economics* 35 (1994): 320–45; Ihlanfeldt, 'Information
    on the Spatial Distribution of Job Opportunities'; Michael Stoll, 'Spatial Job Search,
    Spatial Mismatch, and the Employment and Wages of Racial and Ethnic Groups in
    Los Angeles', *Journal of Urban Economics* 46 (1999): 129–55. Although, see
    Samuel Cohn and Mark Fossett, 'What Spatial Mismatch? The Proximity of Blacks
    to Employment in Boston and Houston', *Social Forces* 75 (1996): 557–72; but see
    also Richard W. Martin, 'The Adjustment of Black Residents to Metropolitan
    Employment Shifts: How Persistent is Spatial Mismatch?', *Journal of Urban
    Economics* 50 (2001): 52–76. Discriminatory attitudes among some employers work
    in concert with these historical trends and locational dynamics: again, see Moss and
    Tilly, *Stories Employers Tell*; but also Cornell and Welch, 'Culture, Information,
    and Screening Discrimination'. Relevant too are the urban consequences of a
    general decline in manufacturing employment in the US economy: see John D.
    Kasarda, 'Urban Industrial Transition and the Underclass', *Annals of the American
    Academy of Political and Social Science* 501 (1989): 26–47. But the consequences
    of these trends for the vitality of urban economies are not as straightforward as
    some have supposed: see Paul Krugman, 'The Localization of the World Economy',
    New Perspectives Quarterly 12 (1995): 34–8; Meric S. Gertler, 'Between the Local
    and the Global: The Spatial Limits to Productive Capital', in *Spaces of
    Globalization: Reasserting the Power of the Local*, edited by Kevin R. Cox (New
    York: Guilford, 1997): pp. 45–63.
25. On class homogeneity and declining political engagement in suburban areas, see J.
    Eric Oliver, 'The Effects of Metropolitan Economic Segregation on Local Civic
    Participation', *American Journal of Political Science* 43 (1999): 186–212. More
    generally, consider J. Eric Oliver, 'City Size and Civic Involvement in Metropolitan
    America', *American Political Science Review* 94 (2000): 361–73.
26. See Dorothy Roberts, *Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning
    of Liberty* (New York: Random House, 1997); Martin Gilens, *Why Americans Hate
    Welfare: Race, Media, and the Politics of Antipoverty Policy* (Chicago, IL:
    University of Chicago Press, 1999); Heidi Hartmann, Hsiao-ye Yi, Megan DeBell
    and Jacqueline Chu, 'The Rhetoric and Reality of Welfare Reform', in *Women and
    Welfare: Theory and Practice in the United States and Europe*, edited by Nancy J.
    Hirschmann and Ulrike Liebert (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press,
    2001): pp. 160–76.
27. Affluent prospective homeowners seem to use race as a marker for factors (such as
    unemployment, welfare dependence, poor schools, low property values, and high
    crime rates) associated with lower neighborhood quality, but this may be changing.
    See Ingrid Gould Ellen, 'Welcome Neighbors? New Evidence on the Possibility of
    Stable Racial Integration', *Brookings Review* 15 (1997): 18–21; 'Stable Racial
    Integration in the Contemporary United States: An Empirical Overview', *Journal of
    Urban Affairs* 20 (1998): 27–42. More generally, see Paul A. Jargowsky, *Poverty
    and Place: Ghettos, Barrios, and the American City* (New York: Russell Sage
    Foundation, 1997) on spatial sorting by socioeconomic class, and especially chapter

six on the responsiveness of neighborhood poverty to regional economic opportunities. On class-related patterns in racist attitudes among white Americans, see J. Eric Oliver and Tali Mendelberg, 'Reconsidering the Environmental Determinants of White Racial Attitudes', *American Journal of Political Science* 44 (2000): 574–89.

28. Again, see Frug, 'The City as a Legal Concept' on the political and legal precedents that some argue have left cities competing for lucrative investments while outlying communities pursue their own land use policies, thus hindering the capacity of city governments to maintain a range of public services through tax revenues and administrative authority over the surrounding region. There is some modest empirical support for this concern: see David Rusk, *Cities without Suburbs* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995); Orfield, *Metropolitics*. Others argue that several independent jurisdictions may result in desirable competition among local governments, allowing citizens to sort themselves according to their preferences and budget constraints. See Charles M. Tiebout, 'A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures', *Journal of Political Economy* 64 (1956): 416–24; Vincent Ostrom, Charles M. Tiebout and Robert Warren, 'The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry', *American Political Science Review* 55 (1961): 831–42; Robert L. Bish, *The Public Economy of Metropolitan Areas* (Chicago, IL: Markham, 1971); Elinor Ostrom, 'The Social Stratification-Governmental Inequality Thesis Explored', *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 19 (1983): 91–112; Mark Schneider, *The Competitive City* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989); David R. Morgan and Patrie Mareschal, 'Central-City/Suburban Inequality and Metropolitan Political Fragmentation', *Urban Affairs Review* 34 (1999): 578–95. The threat of exit by mobile citizens may encourage local governments to be responsive to voice, see William E. Lyons and David Lowery, 'The Organization of Political Space and Citizen Responses to Dissatisfaction in Urban Communities: An Integrative Model', *Journal of Politics* 48 (1986): 321–46; and more generally, Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970). But critics note that effective mobility and political influence are dramatically constrained for just those urban residents who endure poor services and unresponsive institutions, and these inequalities reinforce historical legacies of racial discrimination and subsequent isolation, a fact that should trouble us deeply as a point of justice: see Owen Fiss, *A Way Out: America's Ghettos and the Legacy of Racism*, edited by Joshua Cohen, Jefferson Decker and Joel Rogers (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003). Furthermore, these constraints are arguably sustained in part by the combination of spatial sorting and local control associated with Tiebout-style prescriptions. See Richard Child Hill, 'Separate and Unequal: Governmental Inequality in the Metropolis', *American Political Science Review* 68 (1974): 1557–68; Jargowsky, *Poverty and Place*, Chs. 6–7, especially pp. 201–8.

29. On such spatial patterning (but also the economic heterogeneity and growing income disparities among black Americans) and the enduring legacies of discriminatory zoning and mortgage financing facing affluent black families, see Bart Landry, *The New Black Middle Class* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); Mary Pattillo-McCoy, *Black Picket Fences: Privilege and Peril among the Black Middle Class* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999)

and 'The Limits of Out-Migration for the Black Middle Class', *Journal of Urban Affairs* 22 (2000): 225–42; Bruce D. Haynes, *Red Lines, Black Spaces: The Politics of Race and Space in a Black Middle-Class Suburb* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001).

30. Again, Jargowsky, *Poverty and Place* reveals both the diversity of poor urban neighborhoods and the contrast between these and more affluent areas.

31. See, respectively, Witold Rybczynski, *City Life* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995) and Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, *American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), especially pp. 17–59, 88–114.

32. Sennett, *The Uses of Disorder*, pp. 68–73.

33. Jane Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (New York: Random House, 1961).

34. Might nonresidential land uses in a residential area interfere with informal mechanisms of citizen control over neighborhood spaces, given that visiting nonresidents have no vested interest in the community outside of the specific activity that has brought them there? See Ralph B. Taylor, Barbara A. Koons, Jack R. Greene and Douglas D. Perkins, 'Street Blocks with More Nonresidential Land Use Have More Physical Deterioration: Evidence from Baltimore and Philadelphia', *Urban Affairs Review* 31 (1995): 120–36; see also Oscar Newman, *Defensible Space: Crime Prevention Through Urban Design* (New York: Macmillan, 1972). But consider that the political and economic climate of past decades has created economically homogeneous neighborhoods in many US cities, thus selecting against diverse primary uses associated with a close proximity of workplace and residence for middle-income and upper-income citizens. Jacobs's conjecture cannot be viewed in isolation from historical forces that work to undermine the economic viability of central cities.

35. Jane Jacobs, *The Economy of Cities* (New York: Random House, 1969) and *Cities and the Wealth of Nations: Principles of Economic Life* (New York: Random House, 1984). The evidence for this specific sort of externality is mixed: there is some support for Jacobs's prediction of inter-industry spillover effects driving innovation and growth; others find Marshall-Arrow-Romer (MAR) externalities, that is, knowledge transfers between firms within the same industry; and several researchers have found both Jacobs and MAR externalities at work in urban economies. See Edward L. Glaeser, Hedi D. Kallal, Jose A. Scheinkman and Andrei Shleifer, 'Growth in Cities', *Journal of Political Economy* 100 (1992): 1126–52; Vernon Henderson, Ari Kuncoro and Matt Turner, 'Industrial Development in Cities', *Journal of Political Economy* 103 (1995): 1067–90; Vernon Henderson, 'Externalities and Industrial Development', *Journal of Urban Economics* 42 (1997): 449–70. See also Edward L. Glaeser, 'Learning in Cities', *Journal of Urban Economics* 46 (1999): 254–77. Glaeser speculates that dynamic information externalities facilitate not only transfers of new information and techniques across firms, but also broader ethical and political innovations: see Edward L. Glaeser, 'Cities and Ethics: An Essay for Jane Jacobs', *Journal of Urban Affairs* 22 (2000): 473–93.

36. Sennett, *The Uses of Disorder*, p. 133.

37. For a sense of this possibility, and associated tensions, see Charles Taylor, 'The

Politics of Recognition', in *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, edited by Amy Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 25–73; Thomas M. Scanlon, 'The Difficulty of Tolerance', in *Toleration: an Elusive Virtue*, edited by David Heyd (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 226–39.

38. See, for instance, Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, where reasonableness is understood in terms of mutual justification of public claims by sincere parties. See also Gutmann and Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement* for a congruent account.

39. Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 319.

40. On how interests vested in specific locations are translated into disproportionate political influence in municipal politics, see Stephen L. Elkin, *City and Regime in the American Republic* (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1987), Chs. 3–5; Imbroscio, *Reconstructing Urban Politics*, Chs. 1–2. On the consequences of racial segregation and social isolation for effective political influence in US cities, see Cathy J. Cohen and Michael C. Dawson, 'Neighborhood Poverty and African American Politics', *American Political Science Review* 87 (1993): 286–302. On locational distortions that traditional notions of market efficiency fail to capture and the exclusionary consequences of political coalitions in cities, see Harvey, *Social Justice and the City*, Ch. 2 and *The Urban Experience* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), Chs. 1 and 5.

41. See Robert A. Baade and Richard F. Dye, 'The Impact of Stadiums and Professional Sports on Metropolitan Area Development', *Growth and Change* 21 (1990): 1–14; Robert A. Baade, 'Professional Sports as Catalysts for Metropolitan Economic Development', *Journal of Urban Affairs* 18 (1996): 1–17; Mark S. Rosentraub, David Swindell, Michael Przybylski and Daniel R. Mullens, 'Sport and Downtown Development Strategy: If You Build It, Will Jobs Come?', *Journal of Urban Affairs* 16 (1994): 221–39; Bruce W. Hamilton and Peter Kahn, 'Baltimore's Camden Yard Ballpark', in *Sports, Jobs, and Taxes: The Economic Impact of Sports Teams and Stadiums*, edited by Roger G. Noll and Andrew Zimbalist (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1997), pp. 245–81; Ian Hudson, 'Bright Lights, Big City: Do Professional Sports Teams Increase Employment?', *Journal of Urban Affairs* 21 (1999): 397–407. Michael N. Danielson, *Home Team: Professional Sports and the American Metropolis* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 275–86 provides a good overview of the social-cost concerns associated with stadium projects for professional sports teams in urban regions.

42. See James Howard Kunstler, *Home from Nowhere: Remaking our Everyday World for the Twentieth Century* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).

43. Ibid., pp. 234–49.

44. David Harvey, *Spaces of Hope* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), pp. 164–79.

45. Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*; Manuel Castells, *The Urban Question: A Marxist Approach*, translated by Alan Sheridan (London: Edward Arnold, 1977); Harvey, *Social Justice and the City* and *The Urban Experience*; Mark Gottdiener, *The Social Production of Urban Space*, 2nd edn. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985).

46. See David Sibley, *Geographies of Exclusion: Society and Difference in the West*

(London: Routledge, 1995); Lyn H. Lofland, *The Public Realm: Exploring the City's Quintessential Social Territory* (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1998), pp. 208ff.

47. See, for instance, www.zipcar.com (URL consulted 1 May 2003).

48. On this idea, especially in municipal settings, see Archon Fung and Eric Olin Wright, 'Deepening Democracy: Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance', *Politics and Society* 29 (2001): 5–42; and also Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel, 'Directly Deliberative Polyarchy', *European Law Journal* 3 (1997): 313–42. These arguments are framed in light of several successful recent deliberative reforms, most notably innovations in community policing and school management in Chicago, and participatory strategies for setting priorities for the municipal budget in Porto Alegre, Brazil. On these cases see, respectively, Archon Fung, 'Accountable Autonomy: Toward Empowered Deliberation in Chicago Schools and Policing', *Politics and Society* 29 (2001): 73–104, and Rebecca Abers, 'From Clientelism to Cooperation: Local Government, Participatory Policy, and Civic Organizing in Porto Alegre, Brazil', *Politics and Society* 26 (1998): 511–37.

49. For more detail of the organization and mission of the DSNI, see www.dsni.org (URL last consulted 25 July 2002). For a history of the initiative, see Peter Medoff and Holly Sklar, *Streets of Hope: The Fall and Rise of an Urban neighbourhood* (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1994).

50. Relevant here are recent explorations of feasible schemes of regional governance in US metropolitan areas: see Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*; Peter Dreier, John Mollenkopf and Todd Swanstrom, *Place Matters: Metropolitics for the Twenty-First Century* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001); Gerald E. Frug, 'Beyond Regional Government', *Harvard Law Review* 115 (2002): 1763–836; Myron Orfield, *American Metropolitics: The New Suburban Reality* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2002).

51. Medoff and Sklar, *Streets of Hope*, pp. 147–58.

52. For instance, Joseph E. Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss, 'Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information', *American Economic Review* 71 (1981): 393–410 suggest that, where too little information is available for lenders to distinguish low- from high-risk borrowers, credit will be rationed, leaving excess demand. Under imperfect information, lenders will set interest rates below the market clearing rate, reasoning that demand for credit at higher rates suggests either that the borrower accepts the high rate because she has a low expected probability of repayment (adverse selection) or that, in accepting the higher rate of interest, she will choose a correspondingly riskier investment than she might otherwise select, in an effort to achieve enough of an increase in return to compensate for the higher cost of credit (moral hazard).

53. For an elaboration of this point, see Loren A. King, 'Democratic Hopes in the Polycentric City', *Journal of Politics* 61 (2004): 203–23.

54. See Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*.